This article presents the case for a progressive interpretation of the notion of military objectives in
INTRODUCTION
The nature of warfare is undergoing a paradigm shift. Comparable in significance with the moments when armed contest for the first time expanded into the sea and then into the air, by today, warfare has irrevocably entered another domain: cyberspace.
While this latest development has opened a host of yet unresolved problems ranging from questions of military strategy and tactics, to technical matters and to issues of law, this article focuses narrowly on one significant challenge posed by this development to the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL). Namely, how do we assess, from this perspective, cyber attacks whose aim is the destruction of electronic data, without necessarily resulting in physical damage? In particular, does such data qualify as an 'object' under IHL and may it thus be considered a military objective?
The answer to this question has significant consequences for the conduct of cyber operations in general and cyber warfare in particular. Attacks of this kind have not only been forecast and pondered over in academic literature, 1 but they have become a frequent occurrence in modernday reality. be found in Rule 38 and the attached commentary. 10 The rule forms part of section 4 of chapter 4, entitled 'Attacks against objects' and directly preceded by a section entitled 'Attacks against persons '. 11 As this structure suggests, the authors distinguished between, on the one hand, rules on targeting applicable to living human beings and, on the other hand, those applying to everything else (denoted in the manual as 'objects'). 12 The commentary in the Manual even appears to limit the term 'military objective' only to the latter category, 13 which would, however, be at odds with much of the available state practice, according to which the term comprises individuals, objects, and often even land area.
14 The Manual transplants the wording from the Protocol into its legal definition of the term 'military objective'. 15 The relevant provision, Article 52(2) AP I, considered today as reflective of customary law, 16 reads:
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or 10 Tallinn Manual (n 6) 134-37. 11 Tallinn Manual (n 6) 124 and 113, respectively. 12 See also Tallinn Manual (n 6) 106, rule 30 (stating that cyber attacks may either cause 'injury or death to persons' or 'damage or destruction to objects') (emphases added). 13 Tallinn Manual (n 6) 126 [2] ('As used in this Manual, the term 'military objectives' refers only to those objects meeting the definition set forth in this Rule') (emphasis added). Nevertheless, this use is not entirely consistent throughout the Manual. See, eg, Tallinn Manual (n 6) 123 [4] (acknowledging that an attack 'against a military objective, including combatants, might cause terror') (emphasis added). 14 As expressly mentioned in the text of the rule in fine, tangible technological infrastructure including computers and computer networks is not excluded from the material scope of the rule.
However, this is not the case with computer data.
As the experts tied the definition of military objectives closely to the notion of 'objects', they assigned central importance to the meaning of this term in the framework of the Additional (1) ('A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.'). 22 Tallinn Manual (n 6) 127 fn 82. 23 See Tallinn Manual (n 6) 127 [5] . In addition to the textual method of interpretation, Article 31 also endorses the contextual (or systematic) method, and the teleological (or functional) method. All three are applied to the present data would not fall within the ambit of IHL unless it would affect the functionality of a control system resulting in the need to replace its physical components.
24
The text, however, acknowledges the contrary position held by a 'minority' of the experts, namely that 'for the purposes of targeting, data per se should be regarded as an object'. This position is justified by the essentially teleological consideration that if data was not considered as an object, the act of deletion of valuable civilian datasets would fall outside of the scope of application of IHL, thus contradicting the principle of protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities. 25 The (2011) 104 ('Both approaches have merit, the former in its fidelity to received understandings of IHL, the latter in that it would respond to concerns that the traditional understanding is under-inclusive since it admits of highly disruptive cyber operations to which IHL would not apply.
As it stands, though, the former represents lex lata, the latter lex ferenda.') (italics original). 30 cf Tallinn Manual (n 6) 5-6 (stating that where relevant state practice and opinio juris were lacking, the experts were 'hesitant' to lay down exact scope and application of a given principle of law vis-à-vis the novel situation in cyberspace); see also Schmitt (n 1) 295 (reporting, with respect to the closely related term 'attack' that the experts 'opined that, there being no State practice on the issue, the current law limits the term to physical harm caused to persons and tangible objects') (emphasis added After all, despite the unambiguously proclaimed aim to limit the scope of their scrutiny to lex lata, 44 even the experts arguably tread along both sides of the fuzzy line separating the two dimensions. Putting aside the notion at the centre of the present article, to which I will return shortly, we may pick another one almost at random to demonstrate the flaw at the basis of this objection. Let us consider, for instance, the way in which the experts apply the criterion of minimum organisation to 'virtual' groups.
The Manual discusses 'virtual' groups, or groups organised solely online, in a section concerned with the criteria for the existence of a non-international armed conflict. 45 Although the applicable treaty text, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, does not contain a specific bottom threshold, post-Cold War case-law has identified two-today generally accepted-criteria of minimum intensity of hostilities and minimum organisation of the nonstate conflict party. 46 The Manual reflects and accepts this development, as well.
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It then applies the criterion of 'minimum organisation' to 'virtual' groups, defined as those in which all relevant activities occur online. 48 The experts seemed reluctant to classify any cooperatively operating online group of individuals engaged in cyber attacks as an organised armed group for the purposes of IHL. 49 However, '[t]he majority of [experts] agreed that the failure of members of the group physically to meet does not alone preclude it from having the requisite degree of organisation.' 50 In other words, the majority of experts were willing to accept that a 'virtual' group could be an organised armed group under IHL (triggering the application of the law of non-international armed conflicts).
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The experts did not identify any state practice or opinio juris to bolster this interpretation. This is not surprising. After all, 'online' or 'virtual' groups engaged in cyber warfare are a novelty, objective' if it fulfils the criteria specified in the provision with respect to objects. 65 None of the other state parties objected to this interpretation, which means that we may safely assume that localities were to be considered a subclass of objects. 66 The dichotomy persons-objects insofar as the construction of these provisions is concerned, thus appears to be correct.
This well-accepted and uncontroversial interpretation would, however, be turned upside down if data were held to belong in the 'non-object' category, heretofore populated by living human beings only.
Second, the 'alternative route' interpretation would consequently leave no valid criterion to assess whether a specific dataset would be a military objective. This is so due to the fact that in order to determine whether a specific object or a person is targetable in the specific circumstances, IHL sets out different legal criteria.
On the one hand, the rule for objects is spelled out in the second half of the second sentence of Article 52(2). This provision contains a two-pronged test, which requires that the object in question makes an effective contribution to military action and that its destruction, capture or neutralisation offers a definite military advantage. 67 Although this test is suitable in application to data equally as it is to tangible objects (a point to which I return in the next section), it would not be available due to the interpretation of data as a non-object.
On the other hand, criteria which determine whether a certain person may permissibly be targeted in combat, are without hesitation inapplicable to non-living things, whether tangible or not. It would be patently absurd to insist that the targetability of a certain dataset is assessed on the basis of its 'combatant status' or 'direct participation in hostilities'. It thus becomes clear that the association of data with other non-objects in the normative framework of Additional Protocol I would lead to absurd results. Therefore, despite its initial appeal, the 'alternative route' solution must also be rejected.
PROPOSED VIEW: DATA IS AN OBJECT, ERGO IT MAY BE A MILITARY OBJECTIVE
The view advocated by this article is that data may, contrary to the conclusion reached by the experts drafting the Tallinn Manual, be indeed considered as an object within the meaning of Article 52(2). If this interpretation is correct, whether a particular dataset is a military objective would be considered by reference to the criteria in the second part of the second sentence of that provision. 68 In this section of the article, my aim is to expound the term 'object' in Article 52(2) AP I using the generally accepted methods of treaty interpretation as codified in the VCLT.
It is submitted that the ensuing analysis applies to a great extent to the meaning of the term 'object' under customary international law, as well. This is despite the obvious fact that stricto sensu, the VCLT does not apply to norms of customary law. 69 The possibility that a norm exists in parallel in both treaty law and customary law is firmly established in international law. 70 Article 52(2) can safely be described as a 'fundamentally norm-creating' treaty rule of the kind the ICJ 24 (1) (in this first definition of a military objective, the term used in place of an 'object' was, somewhat tautologically, 'objective', which may further explain the authors' need to distinguish objects from goals or aims).
sense. 87 Belligerents would gain a trump card if they wanted to pursue an attack against an object which would not meet the orthodox understanding: they could just claim they need to destroy it in order to neutralise the aim of the enemy. 88 Civilian infrastructure would thus become fair game through the backdoor of this too broad interpretation of the term objective. However, it would be incorrect to read more into the ICRC Commentary.
89

Contemporaneity
Since we cannot accept the interpretation of the term 'object' adopted from the ICRC The terms of a treaty must be interpreted according to the meaning which they possessed, or which would have been attributed to them, and in the light of current linguistic usage, at the time when the treaty was originally concluded. For Fitzmaurice, this principle derived from the rule that the rights of parties to a dispute, as they stood at a certain date, should be adjudged on the basis of the law as it was at that same date. 92 In relation to treaties, he added, 'it follows automatically' that a valid determination could only be reached on the basis of the contemporaneous meaning of the terms at the date when the treaty was concluded.
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Although Fitzmaurice's position carried a great weight at the time, it is submitted that it was overbroad already at the time of the writing and has since been superseded by the ensuing development of international legal practice. First, the principle of contemporaneity as proposed by Fitzmaurice was overbroad as it assumed without any further analysis that for any dispute on any point of law arising from a treaty, the appropriate reference point would be the state of law at the time of the conclusion of the treaty. This is patently not true for all conceivable situations.
The original understanding of a treaty obligation may lose its meaning, become absurd or manifestly inapplicable with the passage of time, leading to the necessity to abandon the strict application of this principle in a given case. After all, prior rulings departing from or ignoring this putative principle had existed already by the time of Fitzmaurice's writing in 1957.
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Second, whatever the status of the alleged principle was at that time, the following course of events undermined its claim to universal applicability. If it be contended that, at the time of concluding the treaties, neither party thought of British subjects domiciled in Smyrna, that may perhaps be true, for little indeed was known or thought of domicile, in the legal sense of the term, in those early times; but if the words of the treaty are sufficient to cover the case, and if the object of the treaties was to apply to all British merchants, then the application to a State of circumstances not particularly contemplated, but within the general scope of the treaties, would not limit their construction. It was suggested in later writing that in proposing the principle of contemporaneity, Fitzmaurice placed too much importance on Judge Huber's ruling in Island of Palmas Arbitration (1928) 2 RIAA 829, where Huber was, however, analysing the acquisition of title of territory. In that context, the application of the principle of contemporaneity is more appropriate, but it is questionable whether it can be extrapolated as a general principle of treaty interpretation valid for all cases. Provided that, where it can be established that it was the intention of the parties that the meaning or scope of a term or expression used in the treaty should follow the development of the law, the treaty must be interpreted so as to give effect to that intention.
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Returning to the subject of the present inquiry, how do we choose between Fitzmaurice's and
Thirlway's understandings of contemporaneity? It is submitted that for three independent reasons, we ought to rely on this latter 'qualified' principle in interpreting the term 'object' in Article 52(2). The first reason relates to the nature of the Protocol and the term in question. As the ICJ held in the Navigation Rights case, if parties choose a generic term in a treaty entered into for a very long period, they should be presumed to have intended for such a term to have an evolving meaning. 99 As we know, the Protocol is a treaty of indeterminate duration and the term in question is a generic one, supporting the use of evolutive interpretation.
Secondly, the object of the Protocol as a treaty providing for the protection of victims of armed conflicts 100 also supports the resort to evolutive interpretation. The three most influential international human rights tribunals have established that human rights treaties are living instruments which must be interpreted in light of the present-day conditions. 101 It is submitted that when in doubt whether to turn to the originalist or evolutive reading, the latter should be here the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties necessarily having been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where the treaty has been entered into for a very long period or is "of continuing duration", the parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those terms to have an evolving meaning.'). 100 See section 5.2 below for a detailed analysis of the object and purpose of the Protocol with respect to the analysed provision. 104 It has been correctly observed that the merit of this passage in the opinion was to embrace a dynamic approach to IHL in general. 105 As a further example, in the Targeted Killing case, the Israeli Supreme Court was faced with the question when a civilian is taking direct part in hostilities and thus loses his or her protection from attack under Article 51(3) of the Protocol. The Court unequivocally embraced an evolutive interpretation of that provision, reasoning that if the reality changes, the interpretation of previously developed rules must evolve, as well. 106 Although the decision of the Supreme Court has been subject to a considerable degree of criticism, the application of the evolutive method of interpretation to Protocol I terms has not been subsequently objected to. 107 light of the present-day conditions. In this respect, we may be assisted by the other authentic language versions of the Protocol 108 as well as by a closer examination of the modern reality relevant to the present subject.
Firstly, there is a striking discrepancy dividing the six authentic language versions of the conceivably exist in an intangible form is mentioned solely in order to shed more light on the meaning of the word 'object' in the English version of the Protocol.
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Secondly, I turn to the question whether the present-day reality has evolved with an effect on the ordinary meaning of the term 'object'. In order to do that properly, we must not examine the term in abstract but in the context of the Protocol as such. 119 I have already stated that the remainder of the sentence in which the term 'objects' finds itself rules out the abstract meaning of the word in the sense of a goal or a purpose.
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The examined term appears in Section I of Part IV of the Protocol. Although the section is labelled 'General Protection Against Effects of Hostilities', it also sets out the key rules on targeting during international armed conflicts. 121 The understanding of the term 'object' throughout this section generally means something that may become the target of attacks. 122 It must thus be something susceptible to 'destruction, capture or neutralization'.
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It is submitted that data fits this description. Even though the Manual itself does not consider this issue further, the chairman of the group of experts has raised two different cogent objections in his writing in defence of the view found in the Manual. I will address them in turn.
First, Professor Schmitt has argued that destruction of data without direct physical consequences is more akin to psychological operations, which fall outside of the scope of the rules on targeting in Protocol I. 124 Second, he has claimed that if all data were treated as an object, states would have to forfeit their ability to conduct some operations with effect on civilians. According to this argument, the states would therefore not accept such a limitation.
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As to the first point, is computer data analogous to abstract notions such as population morale or to 'tangible' things such as a bridge? While morale may be affected by attacks, it is a subjective category whose existence or extent cannot be objectively determined. A bridge, on the 118 cf VCLT, art 23(1) ('When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.') (emphasis added) and art 23(3) ('The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.') (emphasis added). 119 Villiger (n 23) 426 ('the ordinary meaning of a term is not to be determined in the abstract but in the context of the treaty'). 120 See text at nn 85-89 above. 121 See generally Bothe, Partsch and Solf (n 60) 274-80. 122 ibid 285 ('So far as the term "military objectives" pertains to objects ... [a]s used in Section I of Part IV, it generally means the target of attacks'). 123 AP I, art 52(2) in fine. 124 Schmitt, 'Cyber Operations' (n 29) 92-96. 125 Schmitt (n 1) 298.
other hand, either remains unscathed, is damaged, or is no more. Its existence and condition does not depend on subjective assessment or belief.
Computer data as generally understood today is more akin to the latter. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, in the realm of computing, data means 'the quantities, characters, or symbols on which operations are performed by a computer, being stored and transmitted in the form of electrical signals and recorded on magnetic, optical, or mechanical recording media'. 126 It is true that at a certain point it might be difficult to determine whether a particular dataset has been tampered with from the outside, as the attacker may conceal his or her traces. For example, although various organisations within Iran were targeted by the Stuxnet virus as early as June 2009, its existence was only discovered 13 months later. 127 However, this difficulty does not mean that the potential alteration or destruction of data in question is categorically indeterminable. Likewise, a bridge located in a place too remote for a belligerent to determine its current state or even existence would not become a non-object for the purposes of Article 52 (2) of the Protocol.
In a recent article, Noam Lubell also rejects the analogy between cyber and psychological operations, although he arrives at the same conclusion on the basis of a different line of argument focussed on the notion of attack, not object. 128 He emphasises that the nature of psychological operations is to convince and not to harm, whereas cyber operations will inevitably cause some form of harm, which may in some cases cross the threshold of attack.
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The present analysis is in agreement with Lubell's conclusion. However, it bears emphasising that unlike Lubell, I am not concerned here with the required intensity of harm, only with the eligibility of certain type of objects to be harmed at all. Not all types of interference with data would amount to harm in this sense: for instance, misappropriation or misuse of data might not, whereas its deletion or alteration most likely would. Nevertheless, because data is susceptible to destruction and this destruction would be objectively verifiable-even if at times, admittedly, with some or significant evidentiary difficulty-the analogy with psychological operations must be rejected at this point.
130
The second objection relates to the states' supposed unwillingness to accept the definition of data proposed here due to it being overbroad. Professor Schmitt has argued that treating data as an object would mean states would no longer be able to engage in cyber activities with effects on the civilian population. 131 His previous writing may provide some guidance as to what kind of activities he had in mind: 'It would appear overbroad to characterize all data as "objects." Surely a cyber operation that deletes an innocuous e-mail or temporarily disrupts a television broadcast does not amount to an unlawful attack on a civilian object.' 132 Although under a certain set of circumstances, this might be the correct conclusion, it is submitted that the premise of the argument is flawed.
For better clarity, let us consider instead the example of the 'innocuous e-mail', but in relation to an equally innocuous letter, one written on paper and sealed in an envelope rather than stored as computer data. As the (somewhat loaded) qualifying adjective 'innocuous' suggests, the letter's destruction per se would indeed likely not be lawful under IHL. This would, however, not be the consequence of the letter not being an object. Rather, its destruction would probably be unlawful as the letter would not be a military objective due to its failing to meet the criteria in Article 52(2), namely the dual consideration whether it makes an effective contribution to the military action of 130 See also ICRC, 'International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts', October 2011, http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/31st-international-conference/31-intconference-ihl-challenges-report-11-5-102-en.pdf, 36 (defining cyber operations as 'operations against or via a computer or a computer system through a data stream [with the aim] to infiltrate a system and collect, export, destroy, change, or encrypt data or to trigger, alter or otherwise manipulate processes controlled by the infiltrated computer system'); US, Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006, http://www.information-retrieval.info/docs/jp3_13.pdf, GL-5 (defining computer network attack as '[a]ctions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves') (emphasis added). These references confirm that both the NGO tasked with the guardianship of IHL and the leading state in the area of cyber warfare adopt the same view of computer data as an object susceptible to destruction by cyber operations as that embraced in the present article. It should be noted that the definition has since been revoked in the new version of the US joint publication. However, press reports following the release of classified documents by the whistleblower Edward Snowden indicate that the same conception of offensive cyber-operations was integrated in a US presidential directive. See further US, Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, 27 November 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf, GL-3 (confirming the removal of the definition of 'computer network attack'); Barton Gellman and Ellen Nakashima, 'U.S. Spy Agencies Mounted 231 Offensive CyberOperations in 2011, Documents Show', Washington Post, 30 August 2013 (reporting a presidential directive issued in October 2012, which defines 'offensive cyber-operations as activities intended "to manipulate, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers or computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves"'). 131 Schmitt (n 1) 298. 132 Schmitt, 'Cyber Operations' (n 29) 96. one conflict party and whether its destruction would offer a definite military advantage for the other.
It is, however, unlikely that states would-within the scope of an armed conflict 133 -engage in a military operation the sole aim of which would be to destroy one civilian letter (or one such e-mail). Such an outcome would in virtually all conceivable situations be the consequence of a larger operation targeting, say, the post office building overtaken by the military forces of the enemy. In this case, if an attack on the post office-cum-military outpost occasioned the destruction of letters stored in the building, their destruction might nevertheless be lawful due to the operation of the rule of proportionality. On its basis, an attack may be expected to cause incidental damage to civilian objects and yet be lawful as long as this damage is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 134 The same considerations would apply to the electronic equivalent of the innocuous civilian letter. Admittedly, its destruction in isolation would most likely fail to meet the criteria of lawfulness under IHL.
However, as long as it would be an incidental effect of an otherwise lawful military operation compliant with the principle of proportionality, the fact that the e-mail was deleted would not amount to an unlawful attack.
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The extant architecture of IHL thus appears to be satisfactory and should not diverge from the expectations of the states. Their capacity to engage in cyber operations occasioning the destruction of data, as long as those operations complied with the applicable rules of IHL, would remain unimpeded. Moreover, as stated above, psychological operations (whether 'cyber' or not in nature) would remain beyond the reach of IHL. In sum, it is hoped that this analysis serves to alleviate to some extent the concern that states would not be willing to accept the interpretation proposed here.
Normative context
What remains to be assessed at this point is the correspondence of the proposed interpretation with the normative framework of which the interpreted provision forms a part, in other words, the broader context surrounding the term 'object'. Do the provisions of Section I of Part IV of the Protocol presume that an 'attack' against an object would have to entail the use of physical or 133 Otherwise IHL would not apply at all. 134 AP I, arts 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(ii), 57(2)(b); ICRC Study (n 4) rule 14. 135 See further Dinniss (n 89) 185-93 (detailing how the fulfilment of these conditions may be assessed with respect to objects understood in the sense advocated in this article).
persuasively shown that even though the definition of 'attack' in Article 49 AP I is 'instrumentality-based', the rest of the Section takes a 'consequence-based' approach when operationalising the term. 137 In other words, even though attacks were originally defined as that, taking the present-day conditions into consideration, the proposed interpretation of data as an object better fits the context of the interpreted provision.
OBJECT AND PURPOSE
Finally, we need to examine the possible interpretations of the term 'object' with regard to the object and purpose of the Protocol. Not only is the recourse to teleological interpretation mandated by the VCLT, but its importance is further underlined by the fact that the Protocol is a multilateral treaty of humanitarian import. For treaties of this nature, examining the object and purpose is particularly important and may even prevail over the intentions of the parties. . 144 Bothe, Partsch and Solf (n 60) 288 ('[the term "attacks"] applies to those aspects of military operations which most directly affect the safety of the civilian population and the integrity of civilian objects') (emphases added), cited with approval in Schmitt, '"Attack" as a Term of Art' (n 29) 291 fn 36. 145 The experts, apparently aware of some of the undesirable consequences of this position, built in a patchwork of solutions for the protection of some ostensibly civilian uses of data. With respect to the above-mentioned example of personal medical records, rule 71 prohibits to make medical data 'the object of attack'. This is an apparent contradiction with the interpretation of data as a non-object the interference with which is not considered an attack for the purposes of IHL. The Manual seems to tacitly acknowledge as much but it just states pragmatically (and without any further explanation or citation) that '[p]ersonal medical data required for the treatment of individual patients is likewise protected from alteration, deletion, or any other act by cyber means that would negatively affect their care, regardless of whether such acts amount to a cyber attack.' See Tallinn Manual (n 6) 206 (emphasis added). The outcome is to be commended, but the process of reasoning used is, unfortunately, strained and self-contradictory. 146 Teleological interpretation is also an available method of interpretation with respect to customary norms. 148 It is submitted that the telos of a treaty rule of a norm-creating character carries over into customary international law in case of its evolution into custom. 149 In addition, the analysis of the object and purpose of the Protocol carries an additional degree of relevance for those states that have signed but not ratified this instrument-a category which includes, but is not limited to, the United States. 150 According to the accepted rules of treaty-making, such states are bound to refrain from acts that would undermine the object and purpose of the treaty in question. 151 Although a treaty may have several objects and purposes, 152 it would hardly be doubted that one of the main ones if not the object and purpose of the Additional Protocol is to improve the protection of victims of armed conflicts compared to that provided by the four Geneva
Conventions: The title of the Protocol states it is 'relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts'. 153 Its preamble mentions the goal of enhancing the protection as something the state parties considered necessary. 154 The ICRC Commentary states expressly that this was the object and purpose of the Protocol 155 and the same position has been taken for granted by the academia 156 and international jurisprudence. 157 The rules in Part IV of the Protocol focus specifically on civilians as a subcategory of victims of armed conflicts. 158 We may thus infer that the object and purpose of Article 52(2) and its normative context is the enhancement of the protection of civilians during the situations of armed conflict. 159 Of the two potential interpretations, we must thus choose the one which better serves the identified object and purpose of the Protocol.
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The interpretation propounded in the Manual removes data from the scope of IHL unless its destruction entails the loss of functionality of physical infrastructure (computers and networks)
carrying the data in question. 161 In addition, the experts only considered an interference with functionality to qualify as damage if restoration of functionality requires replacement of physical components. 162 What this means is that a lot of targets whose physical equivalents are firmly protected by IHL from enemy combat action would be considered fair game as long as the effects of the attack would remain confined to cyberspace. This is, unfortunately, not just a fanciful comment without any real support in the field. Cordula Droege sums up the literature which puts forward the view that the availability of cyber operations expands the list of legitimate targets as even attacks on objects which are prohibited in the physical world might now be considered legal. The interpretation of data as non-object would thus greatly expand the class of permissible targets in warfare. It is submitted that this expansion would go against the object and purpose of the Protocol as it would expose the civilian population to additional danger instead of providing it with protection. The general principle of IHL that the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited 166 further supports a restrictive interpretation of the notion of military objectives. 167 Because anything 168 that is not an object cannot qualify as a military objective, we should therefore interpret the term 'object' broadly in order to achieve the aim underlying the rules on targeting. Accordingly, data should, also on the analysis of object and purpose of the Protocol, be considered an 'object' in this context. 169 This interpretation has the additional benefit of providing clarity as to the identification of permissible military targets in cyber warfare. For example, bringing down a website used solely for military purposes would clearly qualify as an attack on a military objective under IHL. The Tallinn Manual recognises that such a cyberspace-confined object-using the example of 'a website passing coded messages to resistance forces behind enemy lines'-would be making an effective contribution to military action. 170 However, due to its approach, it is forced to maintain a strained reasoning that the military objective in this case would not be the website itself, but 'the cyber infrastructure supporting the website'. 171 This is entirely counterintuitive and without correspondence in reality, where any attempt to bring the website down would likely take the form of a denial-of-service attack and would certainly not have any consequences in physical space, or even demand the replacement of physical components. 172 To interpret the law without due regard to the changes in reality is to risk its reduction into irrelevance. The Tallinn Manual is therefore a very valuable contribution to the interpretation of international law with respect to the novel challenges posed by cyber warfare. Nevertheless, it is the contention of this article that in one narrow aspect, the Manual has not succeeded in this aim.
This article has put forward the view that, in spite of the dearth of state practice on the matter, the concept of military objectives in IHL should properly be construed to include computer data. It has been argued that data is an 'object' for the purposes of the IHL rules on targeting. The interpretation proposed by this article is openly evolutive in character. This is, however, the rule rather than an exception in this area. The rapid development of information technology in the decades following the adoption of the Protocol has entailed an unprecedented challenge for IHL. Both civilian life and military operations depend to a growing degree on information and activities confined to cyberspace, with little to no ramifications in the physical world. If the law of armed conflicts is to retain its relevance, it ought to reflect this change. That is why, it is submitted, in 2014, computer data are objects under international humanitarian law. 173 Bothe, Partsch and Solf (n 60) 326 (emphasis added). 174 
